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The Law Schools' Failing Grade on
Federalism
Ben W. Heineman, Jr.t
Professor Cover's paper on federalism barely relates to the topic of the
symposium-The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems. and Possibilities in
the Administrative State-and this problem symbolizes a larger, more se-
rious failure of the law schools.
The paper is court centered. But the main issues of federalism today
are defined more by policy and politics than by judges. The question of
what is desirable and feasible policy is vastly more important and more
interesting than what is constitutionally permissible policy.
The paper is abstract and not grounded in economic and social fact. But
federalism for what purposes and in what context: health, eduation, wel-
fare, urban development, social services, racial equality, jobs and training,
crime prevention, or mass transit?
The paper is ignorant of actual administrative structure and practice.
An elaborate edifice of federal-state statutes, regulations, and custom has,
of course, been erected in the past fifty years. Different areas-for exam-
ple, health care, cash assistance, education-have very different histories
and patterns of law and practice. But how these patterns have
evolved-and how the Great Society altered the varied New Deal legacy
(significantly in many instances relevant to federalism issues)-is not even
mentioned, let alone described.
The paper is extremely weak in prescriptions that would be useful to a
political executive, agency administrator, or legislator. A mayor or county
manager, a welfare group or medical association director, a governor or
president, a state legislator or committee chairman, would not find the
piece of more than passing interest, if that. I have never understood why it
is acceptable practice within the legal teaching profession to recommend
relatively narrow doctrinal changes to courts, but not to take on the com-
plex task of making more sweeping recommendations to legislatures.
Surely it is not because the judicial process is somehow less political, more
rational and more important than the legislative process. (Does any reader
of this Comment seriously believe that ideas do not count in the legislative
arena or that judges do not often render broad, "legislative" decisions by
t Mr. Heineman, a lawyer in Washington, D.C., was Assistant Secretary for Planning and Eval-
uation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare during the Carter Administration.
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making value judgments first and justifying them later?) In any event, the
paper reflects the dubious, if pervasive, professorial practice of giving leg-
islative prescriptions short shrift.
The irony of these failings is that we are living in a period of great
ferment about "federalism." It is, in fact, possible, though perhaps not
likely, that a new public philosophy on the proper relationship between
the federal and state governments will emerge in this decade to replace the
New Deal-Great Society consensus. Recent national administrations have
struggled unsuccessfully to give birth to a "new federalism," and the pres-
sure for significant change, while yet unchanneled, remains strong.
This Comment discusses three ways of thinking about the possibilities
of a new federalism consensus-in terms of policy conflicts, political con-
flicts, and functional analysis. A final section briefly suggests middle- or
longer-term approaches to contemporary federalism.
I. Policy Conflicts
A new federalism consensus would respond to a host of problems that
stem from the most significant legacy of the New Deal and its direct de-
scendant, the Great Society-the vast increase in the tasks that the na-
tional government has undertaken, especially in the social welfare area,
and usually with state and local governments. These problems may be
expressed in terms of the following policy dilemmas.
(1) Coverage v. Cost. Despite the legislation of the past fifty years, tens
of millions of Americans have incomes below poverty level, receive no or
inadequate medical care, are provided substandard education, live in sub-
standard housing, and cannot escape from "structural" unemployment.
Yet to close these gaps in coverage would require tens of billions of dollars
from federal, state, or local governments in an era of budgetary restraint.
(2) Universal v. Means-Tested Programs. In a period of constrained
resources, it may be necessary to target funds more carefully on those with
"need" rather than to increase expenditures for "universal" programs that
benefit most citizens to some degree. The New Deal's major social welfare
reform-Social Security-was a federal, "universal" program; the Great
Society's major emphasis was on opportunity for the poor and near poor
using a mix of federal, state, and local roles. But the policy impulse for
better "targeting" of programs on those in need is countered by the ad-
ministrative reality that to "means test" requires more bureaucrats and
more "process."
(3) Comprehensive v. Incremental Change. Many policy analysts, not-
ing the haphazard program growth in areas like income security or health
care, suggest that comprehensive reform programs offer a more sensible
policy approach. But for a variety of fiscal, administrative, and political
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reasons, incremental, albeit "messier," steps may be more feasible in the
near term.
(4) Uniformity v. Pluralism. Many would argue that national programs
meeting national needs should be uniform, but this approach conflicts
with the nation's pluralist, federalism traditions. A commonplace compro-
mise-joining federal-state financing and monitoring with state adminis-
tration-has often led to the worst, not the best, of both worlds. Medicaid,
for example, with its mix of federal-state financing and state administra-
tion, is generally regarded as one of the worst run social welfare pro-
grams, however laudable its goals.
(5) Efficiency v. Accountability. In the 1970's, Congress began to write
overly detailed laws in an effort to limit executive branch discretion in the
administration of social welfare programs in which state and local govern-
ments had a role. At the same time, the executive branch often issued
excruciatingly detailed and burdensome regulations to control the exercise
of state and local discretion in such areas as federal aid to education. To-
day, there is recognition that the tension between efficiency and accounta-
bility may have been resolved too far in favor of accountability.
A companion set of issues relates to whether the federal government
should regulate the states by direct or indirect methods. Are block grants
to the states and loose federal oversight preferable to narrow, categorical
programs and more stringent federal oversight? To achieve state ac-
countabilty to federal purposes, is it preferable to impose procedural re-
quirements and financial penalties for poor performance or to establish
substantive standards with financial rewards for good performance?
(6) State v. Local. The federalism debate is not just over whether gov-
ernmental functions are best carried out at a federal or state level. Just as
often, there are important questions about whether local rather than state
government is better suited to finance, administer, or evaluate various
programs.
(7) Theory v. Ignorance. The major federal-state programs are based
on either explicit or implicit theories of change, since they are aimed at
altering social or economic conditions. Yet, these theories are, in turn,
based on social science, which, since the mid-1960's, has been subjected to
substantial questioning and revision after being oversold to justify a pro-
gram. Moreover, there is often confusion about actual effects that pro-
grams have or have not had-and even about how they have been admin-
istered. At all levels of government, those who would make changes in
existing programs (either to contract or expand them) have to find an
acceptable balance between perfect theories and knowledge (which will
never exist) and no theories and grossly incomplete knowledge (which too
often exist).
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(8) Demonstration v. National Programs. The "theory v. ignorance"
dilemma often leads to the cry for demonstration programs to "test" un-
tried ideas either under federal direction or at the states' own initiative.
But the utility of social research and experimentation-and who should
conduct it under what standards-is a subject of contentious debate.
Moreover, actually carrying out such a demonstration takes years, and
deciding who shall benefit from it until the results yield a decision on a
national program is, to put it euphemistically, not easy.
(9) The Role of Government. Any debate about federalism will inevita-
bly get caught up in the national debate about what levels of the Gross
National Product should be devoted to government1 and what proportions
should go to defense and domestic spending. But in thinking about "do-
mestic" spending, we should look not just at the federal budget but at the
combined budgets of all levels of government by function, and we should
examine the taxing and spending histories of nations in Western Europe.
Federalism issues also touch a major debate between direct, government
administered programs and more indirect programs involving tax expendi-
tures (credits, deductions) or vouchers. Finally, as new problems emerge,
the argument without end about whether government has any role to play
in addressing social problems or structures will be rekindled-for exam-
ple, should government provide transitional payments or training to work-
ers from "smokestack" industries who have permanently lost their jobs?
II. Political Conflicts
These conflicts in social welfare policy, which affect federal, state, and
local governments, are mirrored in fundamental political conflicts, not just
among political parties or between "liberals" and "conservatives," but
among affected individuals. Anyone approaching the subject of federalism
today will soon become deafened by the din from the following battles.
(1) Existing Recipients v. Future Recipients. The political impulse to
"grandfather" existing recipients-that is, to protect their present level of
benefits in any program change-is always strong, but it often undercuts
the desire to make more "rational" for future recipients the spate of pro-
grams that may have grown up in an area. The problems of "grandfather-
ing" may also significantly decrease the probability of enacting major re-
forms because carving out elaborate exceptions to reforms can impose
significant administrative costs or prevent savings needed to finance such
reforms.
(2) Young v. Old. It is a commonplace that we are now living in the
1. At present, this figure for federal, state, and local governments is about 33%. J. PALMER & I.
SAWHILL, THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT 100 (1982).
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midst of a demographic phenomenon-the aging of America (and indeed
the aging of the aging). Yet, with scarce government resources, the claims
on the public fisc of programs for the aged are in sharp conflict with the
claims of programs for the young-at all levels of government.
(3) Poor v. Middle Class. Similarly, the huge, inexorable growth of the
non-means tested government "entitlement" programs that benefit the
middle class-like Social Security and Medicare-has meant that funding
for programs aimed just at poor people, especially "discretionary" pro-
grams (subject to the annual appropriations process), has been either cut
or held level (that is, cut in real terms given inflation). This political con-
flict, like the tension between young and old, affects domestic programs
(and planning) at all levels of government.
(4) Region v. Region. Regional conflict is as old as the Republic, and
we are now in another period of intense sectional rivalry-this time con-
cerning the equities of inter-state funding flows generated by federal tax-
ing and spending policies. These issues of funding flows-how much, for
example, do New York and Mississippi get back from the federal govern-
ment for each federal tax dollar sent to Washington-are sharpened by,
and partly cause, another demographic change currently underway: major
population shifts from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West.
(5) State v. Local. This conflict, while it often has a policy dimension, is
also worthy of note as a fundamental political conflict at the core of any
debate about federalism. Governors are always jousting with mayors and
county executives for control of federal funds and "federalism" programs.
III. A Functional Perspective
In addition to exploring policy and political conflicts, a third way to
think about contemporary federalism, and about the possibilities of a new
federalism consensus, is functionally-a method of analysis that should be
readily understood and applied in the law schools. This method looks at
the range of programs where there is shared federal-state-local responsi-
bility and asks:
First, who has the discretion to establish benefits-and what are they?
Second, who establishes the eligibility criteria for determining which
citizens qualify for what benefits-and what are they?
Third, who finances the benefits-and by what method?
Fourth, who monitors, evaluates, and plans future changes in the
programs?
Fifth, who actually administers these program functions, that is, who
distributes benefits, actually determines eligibility, and collects and distrib-
utes funds within governments?
Only after obtaining this type of knowledge across types of programs
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can one begin the pressing job of sorting out which levels of government,
if any, should perform which tasks today, and answering the crucial ques-
tion of where the financial burden for which type of program should lie.
IV. Possibilities: Long Term-Middle Term
Surely the complex of questions surrounding contemporary federalism
is factually intriguing, conceptually challenging, and eminently worthy of
sustained analysis by the law schools. For example, there is today a clear
need to develop alternatives to the nation's current income security "sys-
tem"-congeries of programs that are a mixed federal-state responsibility.
These programs-broadly defined to include social insurance, needs-tested
cash and in-kind transfers, public service employment, social service ef-
forts and various tax expenditures-now constitute approximately half of
the federal budget.2 Similarly, they constitute approximately twenty-eight
percent of total state expenditures for 1981.' They have grown in an in-
cremental fashion since 1935. Although they have individually, or in some
combination, been the subject of numerous studies, an overview is needed.
(1) The interrelationships between the programs are not well under-
stood, although many citizens benefit from a number of them. Thus
changes in a particular program are often not considered with the effects
on other programs clearly in view, in part because good information is not
available.
(2) The cost of the programs has been rising rapidly, and the system
must be seen as a whole to understand the significant cost implications for
the future, and how these costs relate to the general growth of the econ-
omy, to our national economic health, and to the economic health of indi-
vidual states.
(3) The adequacy of the programs for various groups within our society
is also questionable-for example, the working poor may not qualify for
important income-tested programs like Medicaid-and the gaps in cover-
age must be closed.
(4) There are substantial work disincentives within the total income
security system, due in part to the overlap between the programs.
(5) The programs suffer from sharply divided jurisdictional responsibil-
ities in the Congress, diffuse management responsibilities among a host of
agencies and departments in the federal government, and confusing differ-
2. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
U.S. INCOME SECURITY SYSTEM NEEDS LEADERSHIP, POLICY, AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 6
(1980).
3. This figure is derived from Census Bureau data cited in Table III of the executive summary of
a January 24, 1983, research report ("The State of the States") prepared by the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees and the Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO.
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entiation of roles among federal, state, and local governments that vary,
often without good reason, among similar programs.
(6) Variation among program features-eligibility, benefits, administra-
tive procedures-confuses the public and contributes to waste and error in
program administration.
(7) There are fundamental questions about such basic conceptual build-
ing blocks for the income security programs as poverty, disability, and
unemployment, and, increasingly, old age and retirement.
An alternative to a comprehensive view of the broad array of social
welfare programs that constitute the income security system would be an
analysis of policies and prospects for "middle-term" change. For example,
at the end of the 1970's, an executive-congressional-state-local consensus
was beginning to emerge around the following changes. In health care,
federalize Medicaid, develop joint administrative systems with Medicare,
and try to find a larger role for the private sector in monitoring and ac-
counting for flows of money within the programs. In elementary and sec-
ondary education, return more authority to the states: A host of federal
categorical programs would be abolished and the federal government
would be primarily responsible only for compensatory education to the
poor and the handicapped through new incentive-based methods of hold-
ing the states accountable. In cash transfer programs, the universal pro-
grams, with their social insurance base, would, of course, remain federal-
ized, but much greater attention would be paid to the relationship of these
programs to the private pension system. The means-tested programs
would be consolidated, would have a greater degree of uniformity, and
would have a higher federally funded floor; methods by which the states
could supplement those floors, however, would be simplified, and these
means-tested cash assistance programs would be more closely integrated
with a combination of private and public sector jobs programs for those
who could work.
But whatever the direction, whether a long-term comprehensive ap-
proach or a middle-term, more incremental approach, the law schools
should be much more directly and heavily involved than they are at pre-
sent in this debate about federalism "possibilities." The issues of federal-
ism are classic problems that deserve detailed law school attention. They
are rich in history. They bristle with difficult administrative detail. They
involve complex, interrelated financing mechanisms. They pose intriguing
problems of making important choices in a state of imperfect knowledge.
And they raise fundamental choices about the kind of society we ought to
be. But they have, in an analytic sense, largely been ignored, left to the
economists, the think tanks, and the schools of public policy.
When I was at HEW, and deeply involved in these problems at both
1355
The Yale Law Journal
administrative and planning levels, I was overwhelmed with reading and
briefings. But not once did I have occasion to look in the law journals, nor
were law professors cited as authority (or ever mentioned) in briefings.
Although we were dealing with nearly half of the federal budget on diffi-
cult issues that implicate every state and locality, the law schools seemed
to have little to say.
I can only hope this will change and that people with great talent like
Bob Cover will turn their energies to these issues. Constitutional history is
important. But it is surely only one part of the needed analysis. And it
does not take us very far along the path to answering legitimate and im-
portant questions about federalism: What is the legacy of the past fifty
years, what are the problems left by that legacy and what are the pos-
sibilities for change. Seeking answers to those questions in the complex
context that I have barely outlined is surely worthy of Professor Cover's
effort-and of his colleagues in the schools of law.
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